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IN  THE COURSE of the last decade,  temporary  changes  in federal  income- 
tax liabilities  have become a major  tool of macroeconomic  policy. The 
chief episodes  so far have been the temporary  surcharge  of 1968-70 and 
the  tax rebate  of 1975. Another  rebate  was  proposed  by the Carter  admin- 
istration  in early  1977 but  was  subsequently  withdrawn. 
There  has been  a lively debate  and  wide disagreement  in the economics 
profession  about  the efficacy  of short-run  changes  in personal  taxes as a 
device  to stimulate  aggregate  demand  and output.  Transitory  tax changes 
are advocated  on the grounds  that they can provide  a prompt  and tem- 
porary  stimulus  or restraint  to the economy  when it is needed and when 
permanent  or longer-acting  changes  are not desirable  because  the struc- 
ture  of tax rates  is deemed  appropriate  for the longer  run.  For a transitory 
tax change such as an income-tax  rebate to accomplish  its purpose,  it 
should  produce  a large  response  in consumption  per dollar  of tax revenue 
lost by the government,  and this response should be concentrated  in a 
short  time  span  following  the  tax  reduction. 
Economists  working  in the tradition  of the permanent-income  and  life- 
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cycle theories  of consumption,  whose  essence  is that  consumers  endeavor 
to even out their  consumption  of goods and services  over a long planning 
horizon,  argue  that  temporary  changes  in the income tax are  a poor  instru- 
ment for stabilization  because the consumption  response  will have the 
wrong  shape.  A temporary  tax cut, it is argued,  initially  will be largely 
saved  and  will  be spent  only  gradually.  Similarly,  a temporary  tax increase 
will initially  be largely  absorbed  by a corresponding  large decline  in per- 
sonal saving,  and only gradually  reduce  consumption,  again  over a long 
period  of time.  This  view  was advanced,  for instance,  by Robert  Eisner,  in 
relation  to the 1968 surcharge.1 
Opponents  of this position contend  that temporary  changes  in taxes 
will promptly  and substantially  affect  consumer  expenditures.  One argu- 
ment  to support  this  belief  could  be that  consumers  are  too myopic  to dis- 
tinguish  between  permanent  and temporary  changes in taxes. A  more 
sophisticated  argument  might  rest  on the service-flow  concept  of consump- 
tion, as embodied  in the permanent-income  and life-cycle theories. In 
practice  (as used, for example,  in the consumption  function  of the MIT- 
Penn-Social  Science  Research  Council-MPS-econometric  model)  con- 
sumption  is defined  as consumer  expenditures  on nondurable  goods and 
services  plus  an estimate  of the imputed  flow of services  from  the existing 
stock  of durable  goods.  Thus,  even if temporary  tax cuts are saved,  in the 
sense that they do not significantly  increase  consumption  on this defini- 
tion, the saving  might  take the form of investment  in consumer  durable 
goods. Hence, a temporary  tax cut might stimulate  consumer  spending, 
even if the permanent-income  and life-cycle  theories  were valid with re- 
gard  to consumption  as they  define  it. 
Still  another  argument  is that  while  large  transitory  or windfall  changes 
in income  may be mainly  absorbed  by saving  with little initial  impact  on 
consumption,  as predicted  by the permanent-income  and life-cycle  theo- 
ries, small  changes  would  be spent  much  like ordinary  income.  It is sug- 
gested  that  rebates  of the magnitude  of that enacted  in 1975 and the one 
proposed  in 1977 belong  to the  class  of "small"  changes. 
Finally, others,  prepared  to accept the usefulness  of the permanent- 
income life-cycle framework  in general,  would argue  that a substantial 
fraction  of such  rebates  will go to households  whose consumption  is con- 
1. Robert Eisner, 'Fiscal  and Monetary Policy Reconsidered,"  American Eco- 
nomic Review, vol.  59 (December 1969), pp. 897-905,  and Eisner, "What Went 
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strained by credit rationing to be below optimum, and who will therefore 
rapidly  spend  them.2  These  observers  presumably  would  expect  the rebate 
to evoke  a substantial  response,  even if probably  a smaller  one than  for a 
commensurate  permanent  tax  reduction. 
The debate  about the effectiveness  of temporary  tax changes  can be 
settled  only by empirical  evidence.  It is, therefore,  somewhat  surprising 
that  while  there  has been some empirical  analysis  of the 1968 income  tax 
surcharge,3  there  has  been  very  little  attempt  to analyze  the 1975 tax rebate 
episode.  One  attempt  was recently  carlied  out by Thomas  Juster.4  He esti- 
mated  a personal  saving  equation  for the United States  using a specifica- 
tion derived  from the work of Houthakker  and Taylor  which  relates  per- 
sonal  saving  to lagged  saving  and  changes  in disposable  personal  income.5 
This specification  is broadly  consistent  with the life-cycle model. Juster 
breaks  disposable  income into labor income, property  income, transfer 
payments,  taxes, and contributions  for social insurance.  His basic model 
predicts  that  the bulk of any change  in taxes, whether  permanent  or tem- 
porary,  is initially  absorbed  by opposite  changes  in saving,  with  consump- 
tion  rising  or falling  only very  gradually.  Accordingly,  Juster's  conclusion 
that  the 1975 rebate  was  treated  by consumers  much  the same  as any  other 
tax change  is consistent  with the hypothesis  that little of the rebate  was 
spent initially.  His results  suggest  that no more than 15 percent  of the 
rebate  was spent  in the  quarter  it was  paid. 
A  casual look at saving rates appears  to show that temporary  tax 
changes  have only modest effects  on consumption.  After the imposition 
of the surcharge  in the third quarter  of 1968, the saving rate declined 
sharply  and  continued  at a low level until  the second  quarter  of 1970, just 
2. This view has been emphasized by, for example, James Tobin and Walter 
Dolde, "Wealth,  Liquidity and Consumption,"  in Consumer  Spending  and Monetary 
Policy: The Linkages,  Proceedings  of a Monetary  Conference (Federal Reserve  Bank 
of Boston, 1971), pp. 99-146. 
3.  Arthur M. Okun, "The  Personal  Tax Surcharge  and Consumer  Demand, 1968- 
70," BPEA, 1:1971, pp.  167-204,  and William L. Springer, "Did the  1968 Sur- 
charge Really Work?"  American Economic Review, vol. 65 (September 1975), pp. 
644-59. An exchange on this topic between Okun and Springer  is found in American 
Economic Review, vol. 67 (March 1977):  Okun, "Did the 1968 Surcharge Really 
Work?: Comment," pp.  166-69,  and Springer, "Did the  1968 Surcharge Really 
Work?: Reply," pp. 170-72. 
4. Thomas Juster, "A Note on Prospective 1977 Tax Cuts and Consumer  Spend- 
ing" (University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1977; processed). 
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States:  Analyses and Projections (Harvard University Press, 1966; 2d ed., 1970). 178  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
before the end of the surcharge.  It jumped dramatically  in the second 
quarter  of 1975 when  the rebate  was paid out and then declined  only to 
71/2  percent  during  the second  half of the year,  approximately  the average 
level. However,  since  no serious  attempt  to explain  consumption  behavior 
predicts  a constant  saving  rate,  these casual  observations  are not conclu- 
sive. In what  follows,  we present  an analysis  of the 1975 rebate  based on 
statistically  estimated  consumption  equations.  We first  examine  the con- 
sumption  sector  of three  large  econometric  models-Data  Resources,  Inc. 
(DRI), Michigan,  and  MPS-to  see what  each  implies  about  the effect  of 
a rebate compared  with a permanent  (indefinite)  tax change, and then 
examine  the forecast  error  from these models during  the rebate  period. 
Finally,  we examine  the rebate  using  a single-equation  model  of consumer 
expenditures  that  we have constructed  explicitly  to test the effects  of per- 
manent  versus  transitory  tax  changes. 
Estimates  from  Large  Models 
None of the three  large  econometric  models  that we use in our initial 
analysis  of the rebate  distinguish  among changes  in disposable  income 
according  to their  source.  By their  structure,  these  models  assume  that  the 
tax rebate  will affect  consumption  to the same extent and with the same 
lags as any  other  change  in income  will.6 A test of the rebate's  actual  effec- 
tiveness  thus consists  of seeing  how well these models track actual  con- 
sumption  over  the  period  affected  by the  rebate. 
While  they all  treat  the rebate  like any  other  kind  of income,  the models 
do differ  substantially  from  one another  in how they model the effects  of 
income changes  on consumption  and thus in their  predictions  of the re- 
sponses of consumption  to the rebate. The DRI model predicts  a very 
prompt  response,  with consumption  directly  affected  by the rebate  in the 
first  two quarters  after  it is paid out. Both the Michigan  and  MPS  models 
predict  much  more  gradual  responses.  The  DRI and  Michigan  models  pre- 
dict  consumption  at a considerable  level of disaggregation,  a fact  that  pro- 
6.  One consequence of this assumption  is that, compared with a permanent  tax 
reduction of, say, $10 billion a year accomplished  through lower withholding rates, 
a $10 billion rebate in one quarter (which is a $40 billion annual rate of increase in 
disposable income for that quarter) will be predicted  to generate more consumption 
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vides a more  exacting  test of their  estimates  of the rebate's  effectiveness. 
While  the main  aim  of this  paper  is to analyze  the response  to the 1975 
tax rebate,  we should  note that it was only one of three changes  in tax 
and  transfer  programs  implemented  at about  the same  time. First, $8 bil- 
lion (a $32 billion annual  rate) was paid out during  the second quarter 
under  the rebate  program.  Second,  tax withholding  was reduced  by $12 
billion  at an annual  rate  starting  in May 1975, in a change  that was legis- 
lated as temporary  but that many expected  to be made permanent.  The 
reduction  was subsequently  reenacted  just  before  the end of the year, and 
we treat  it as a permanent  tax reduction  in the analysis  in this  paper.  Third, 
$1.7 billion  (a $7 billion  annual  rate) was paid  out in June  to social  secu- 
rity recipients.  In addition  to these specially  legislated  changes,  starting 
in the third  quarter  social security  payments  jumped  by $6 billion at an 
annual  rate  as the result  of automatic  cost-of-living  escalation.  As we dis- 
cuss more  fully in connection  with the consumption  equations  developed 
for  this  paper,  we expect  social  security  recipients  to spend  payments  they 
receive  promptly  and fully. Thus we do not treat any of these payments 
to them as part of, or in parallel  with, the tax rebate  itself; we treat the 
tax rebate  as the only change  in disposable  income  during  this period  that 
might  be expected  to provoke a special  response  in consumer  spending. 
However,  in connection  with  the consumption  equations  developed  in the 
latter  part  of this  paper,  we note how the analysis  would  be modified  with 
a different  treatment  of these  other  changes. 
THE  MPS  MODEL 
We begin  by examining  the consumption  sector of the MPS model as 
recently  reestimated  by Jared  Enzler  of the  Research  Division  of the  Board 
of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System.7  The model has no single 
equation  explaining  total consumer  expenditures.  Rather,  it has an equa- 
tion  explaining  "consumption"  (CON) defined  as purchases  of nondurable 
goods and  services  plus the imputed  rental  value of the stock of durables, 
and another  equation  explaining  consumer  durable  expenditure  (ECD). 
The effect  of a tax cut on total consumer  expenditures  is then the sum of 
the effects  on CON  and  on ECD, less  the effect  on the imputed  rental  value 
of durables  which,  however,  cannot  be significantly  affected  over a period 
of a few quarters. 
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The MPS  equation  for CON is in the spirit  of the life-cycle  hypothesis, 
which  implies  that  consumption  in period  t (Ct) is a linear  function  of the 
expected  permanent  value of nonproperty  income net of tax in period I 
(YLP) and aggregate  net worth  at the start  of period  t (Wtl): 
(1)  CC  =  aYL" +  bWt_1. 
As in earlier  versions  of the MPS model, YLP  is replaced  by a dis- 
tributed  lag on real disposable  personal  income  per capita.8  The sum of 
the coefficients  on disposable  personal  income  is 0.694, with the first  co- 
efficient  0.173 and subsequent  coefficients  gradually  declining.  The effect 
of a rebate  in this equation  would  be modeled  by raising  disposable  per- 
sonal income  by the amount  of the rebate  in one single  quarter,  and then 
tracing  the effect  of that  one-quarter  bulge in disposable  income on con- 
sumption  for  that  and  subsequent  quarters. 
Expenditures  on consumer  durables  are explained  as a linear  function 
of CON and  of disposable  personal  income,  plus a number  of other  vari- 
ables reflecting  the relative  price of durables-the ratio of the price of 
durables  to all consumption  goods and the return  on durables  relative  to 
financial  assets. The coefficient  of CON is 0.16 and that of disposable 
income 0.17, both without any lag. Thus the effect of a rebate in the 
durables-demand  equation  is modeled  by raising  disposable  income by 
the amount  of the  rebate  and  tracing  the effect  of that  change  in the quarter 
it occurs  plus the effect  of the change  in CON over that and subsequent 
quarters. 
The quantitative  characteristics  of this  consumption  sector  can  be illus- 
trated  by its predicted  total expenditure  response  in the first  year after  a 
$10 billion tax reduction.  If the reduction  takes the form of a one-time 
rebate,  consumer  spending  is predicted  to rise by $7 billion during  the 
first  year. If it takes the form of reduced  withholding,  so that taxes are 
lower  by $2.5 billion  each  quarter,  consumer  spending  is predicted  to rise 
by $5.5 billion  during  the  first  year. 
How well the model  accounts  for the behavior  of consumption  after  the 
major  tax changes  of 1964 and 1968 may give some indication  of its use- 
fulness  with respect  to the 1975 rebate.  The MPS model understates  the 
8. The MPS definition of disposable personal income differs from the national 
income accounts version in that (a)  it eliminates the interest  paid by consumers,  but 
adds back the imputed service income from durables;  and (b)  it treats federal per- 
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rise in consumer  spending  following  the permanent  tax cut of 1964, but 
only slightly.  In the first  three quarters  of 1964, it underestimates  CON 
by a total of $4.3 billion (1972 prices) at annual  rates; but since it 
overestimates  durable  purchases  by $2.6 billion for the same period, it 
is nearly  on the  mark  for  total  consumer  expenditures.  However,  the model 
misses  appreciably  in the 1968 surcharge  episode.  From 1968:3  to 1970:2, 
it underestimates  CON by a total of $39.4 billion,  or an average  of $4.9 
billion a quarter;  it underestimates  ECD by a total of $10 billion, or an 
average  of $1.25 billion a quarter.  Consumption  is thus underestimated 
by an average  of roughly  $6.1 billion  a quarter  over  the surcharge  period. 
It seems  plausible  to infer that at least some of this error  arises  because 
the model treats  the surcharge  like a permanent  tax increase  while con- 
sumers  treated  it as temporary  and did not reduce consumption  by as 
much  as  they  would  have  in response  to a permanent  change. 
MODEL  PERFORMANCE 
The performance  of the MPS model following  the 1975 rebate  is ana- 
lyzed  in table 1. Because  the two equations  of the MPS are estimated  with 
large autoregressive  coefficients-0.7  for CON and 0.65 for ECD-the 
table  analyzes  the prediction  errors  both  with and  without  the autoregres- 
sive correction.  The first five rows present  results with the correction. 
Because  (somewhat  surprisingly)  the MPS  model  had substantially  over- 
estimated  consumption  in 1975: 1, the corrected  forecast  error,  shown  on 
row 1, is considerably  smaller  in the quarter  of the rebate  than  the uncor- 
rected  error  in row 6 in the bottom  part  of the table. Even with the cor- 
rection,  the model overestimates  consumption  by $5 billion in the first 
quarter,  then has small overestimates  the next two quarters,  and finally 
starts  underestimating,  consumption  in 1976. 
Row 2 gives  the effect  of the  rebate  predicted  by the  MPS.  This  is simply 
the difference  between  the actual  forecast  of the model and an alternative 
forecast  computed  on the assumption  that there had been no rebate- 
subtracting  from  the second-quarter  disposable  income  the amount  of the 
rebate-$25.6  billion (1972 prices) at annual  rates. A comparison  of 
rows  1 and  2 reveals  that  the model's  overestimate  for 1975:2 of $5 billion 
is more than half of the effect that is supposed  to result from the tax 
change.  In other  words,  if the MPS  model  is used to predict  consumption 
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Table 1.  Effects of the 1975 Tax Rebate According  to the MPS Model, 
1975:2-1976:3 
Billions of 1972 dollars  except  as indicated 
Year and quarter 
1975  1976 
Type of equiation  and resuilt  2  3  4  1  2  3 
With autocorrelation correction 
1. Forecast  error  (actual -  predicted)  -5.0  -0.3  -1.7  4.6  2.1  1.7 
2. Predicted  effect of rebate  9.1  3.8  2.9  2.2  1.4  0.9 
3. Estimated  actual  effect of rebate 
(error  assuming  no rebate-row  1 + 
row 2)  4.1  3.5  1.2  6.8  3.5  2.6 
4. Estimated  actual  effect cumulated, 
as percent  of rebate  16.0  29.7  34.4  60.9  74.6  84.8 
5. Predicted  effect cumulated,  as percent 
of rebate  35.5  50.4  61.7  70.3  75.8  79.3 
Without autocorrelation correction 
6. Forecast  error  -8.0  -2.0  -2.2  4.6  2.4  2.2 
7. Estimated  actual  effect (row 6 + 
row 2)  1.1  1.8  0.7  6.8  3.8  3.1 
8. Estimated  actual effect cumulated, 
as percent  of rebate  4.3  11.3  14.0  40.6  55.4  67.5 
Source: Derived  from  the  equations for  consumption  and  consumer durable expenditures of  the 
MIT-Penn-Social Science Research Council econometric model, as explained in the text. 
the amount  in 1975:2 by $4.1 billion (-5  + 9.1).  Clearly,  this figure, 
reported  in row 3, provides  an estimate  of the "true"  effect  of the rebate 
on expenditure.  It must,  of course,  be recognized  that  this  figure  represents 
but an unbiased  point estimate  of the rebate effect subject  to any error 
that the model  would  have made in the relevant  quarters  had the rebate 
never  been enacted.  Finally,  row 4 cumulates  the estimated  actual  effects 
of row  3 and  expresses  them  as  percentages  of the  rebate. 
As row 4 shows,  only an estimated  16 percent  of the rebate  was spent 
in the quarter  in which  it was paid out, and 34 percent  was spent by the 
end of 1975. By 1976:1, four quarters  after  the enactment  of the rebate, 
its effect  is predicted  to become  quite modest, as shown in row 2. How- 
ever, in this and  the following  two quarters,  the MPS appreciably  under- 
estimates  consumers'  expenditure  even allowing  for the tax rebate.  This 
shortfall  implies  a sharp  rise in the estimated  actual  effects  of the rebate 
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biasing  the model's  forecast  downward.  Indeed,  as row 4 shows,  in quar- 
ters four to six after  the rebate,  the additional  expenditure  generated  is 
estimated  at 50 percent  of the rebate, compared  with only 34 percent 
generated  in the  first  three  quarters. 
The calculations  in rows 6, 7, and 8 repeat  the results  of this analysis 
with no correction  for error  autocorrelation.  They show an even smaller 
estimated  effect  of the rebate  in the initial  quarter  and a somewhat  larger 
rise  starting  in 1976. 
According  to the  MPS,  the rebate  clearly  stimulated  consumer  expendi- 
ture.  But the estimated  effect  is relatively  modest,  at least in the first  three 
quarters:  no more  than  one-third  of the rebate  appears  to have been spent 
in this  period.  This effect  is substantially  lower  than  that predicted  by the 
model  had  consumers  responded  to the rebate  as  to an  ordinary  tax  change. 
This is shown by the model's  overprediction  of consumption,  which is 
large  in 1975:2 and persists  at more modest  rates  throughout  the rest of 
1975. It is also brought  out in comparisons  of the estimated  cumulated 
response  (row 4) with the cumulated  response  predicted  by the model 
(row 5).  It is apparent  that through 1975 the response  is consistently 
about  half  as  large  as  the predicted  one, a result  reminiscent  of the 1968-69 
experiment.  The alternative  estimate of the cumulated  effect given in 
line 8 makes  the difference  even more dramatic.  The model further  sug- 
gests that a substantial  response  to the rebate  occurred  in 1976-espe- 
cially  in the  first  quarter-but this  estimate  may  not  be very  reliable. 
THE  DRI  MODEL 
The DRI consumption  sector  splits  consumer  expenditures  into many 
categories.  For most categories,  expenditure  is estimated  as a function  of 
the current  and previous  quarter's  disposable  income,  with 60 percent  of 
the weight  on the current  quarter,  plus a variety  of other  variables  relating 
in particular  to consumer  debt.  Thus in this model,  the full effect  of a re- 
bate  is predicted  to occur  within  the  first  two  quarters. 
Table 2 gives the effect of the 1975 rebate  on total consumption  and 
in several  major  subcategories  of consumption  for 1975:2 and 1975:3,  the 
only quarters  directly  affected  in the DRI model. The model predicted 
total consumption  quite accurately,  overestimating  only slightly in the 
second  quarter  and  being  essentially  on target  in the third  quarter  of 1975. 
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Table 2.  Effect on Consumption  Expenditures  of the 1975 Tax Rebate, 
by Selected Categories, DRI Model, 1975:2 and 1975:3 
Billions of 1972  dollars except  as indicated 
Forecast 
Estimated  actual  effect 
Year  and  error  Predicted  Cumuilated 
quarter,  and  (actual  -  effect of  Error  assuming  as percent 
consumption  predicted)  rebate  no rebatea  of rebate 
category  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1975:2 
Durables  -1.5  3.4  1.9  7.3 
Clothing  0.1  1.2  1.3  5.0 
Food  1.3  1.6  2.9  11.2 
Other  nondurables  -0.  1  0.9  0.8  3.1 
Housing  -0.5  1.1  0.6  2.3 
Total consumer 
spendingb  -0.9  9.6  8.7  33.0 
1975:3 
Durables  0.0  2.3  2.3  16.2 
Clothing  -0.  1  0.8  0.7  7.7 
Food  1.6  1.0  2.6  21.2 
Other  nondurables  0.8  0.6  1.4  8.5 
Housing  0.7  0.7  1.4  7.7 
Total consumer 
spendingb  -0.  1  6.4  6.3  58.0 
Source: Derived from  the consumption sector of  the Data  Resources, Inc.,  econometric model,  as 
explained in the text. 
a.  Column 1 plus column 2. 
b.  Total includes components of consumer spending not listed separately here. 
crease in disposable  income. Specifically,  column 4 shows that an esti- 
mated  58 percent  of the rebate  was spent  in the first  two quarters,  as com- 
pared  with 62 percent  predicted  by the model (the effects  of column  2 for 
the  two  quarters  expressed  as a percent  of the rebate). 
Taking  account  of changes  in consumption  rather  than  levels alters  the 
picture  somewhat.  The model underestimated  consumption  by some $3 
billion in the first quarter  of  1975, so that the forecast change over- 
estimated  the actual  rise  in consumption  from  the first  to the second  quar- 
ter  by almost  $4 billion.  If the rebate  is removed  from  disposable  personal 
income (the column  3 concept), the second-quarter  increase  is underesti- 
mated by $5.7 billion. Finally,  because  DRI again underestimates  con- 
sumption  by $41/2 billion in the fourth quarter,  it underestimates  the 
change in consumption  by about this same amount.  If the rebate  is re- 
moved from disposable  income, this error  becomes an overestimate  of 
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Thus,  in terms  of level forecasts,  the DRI model strongly  supports  the 
view that the rebate  was largely spent within the first two quarters,  as 
though  the public had treated  it much as a permanent  rise and fall in 
taxes.  On  the  other  hand,  in terms  of changes  in consumption,  the observed 
values  fall roughly  midway  between  those predicted  by the model assum- 
ing zero and  full effect  of the rebate.  Considering  that the model  was esti- 
mated  through  1975:4, it may be that  the close fit of the two rebate  quar- 
ters was achieved at the expense of underestimating  the neighboring 
quarters.9 
Further  doubts  are  raised  by an examination  of the categories  of com- 
modities on which, according to DRI, the rebate was spent. Column 3 im- 
plies that a good share of the rebate was spent on durable  goods and 
clothing.  Over  the two quarters,  these account  for 41 percent  of the total 
estimated  expenditure  of $15 billion, and for 24 percent  of the rebate. 
These implications  seem eminently  plausible: durables  and clothes are 
precisely  the goods  in which  a proponent  of the life-cycle  and  permanent- 
income  hypotheses  would  expect  some  of a windfall  to be "invested,"  since 
they provide  a flow of services  for some time-they  are not "consumed" 
at once. But the DRI model  also implies  that  21 percent  of the rebate  was 
spent  on food, or nearly  as much as on durables  and clothing  combined. 
Another 16 percent  is supposed  to have been spent on housing  services 
(mainly  rents,  both actual  and imputed)  and  on other  nondurables  (such 
items  as drugs,  tobacco,  and  books). While  we are open to the suggestion 
that some of the rebate  was used to finance  a night  on the town, we find 
it hard  to believe  that 60 percent  of the expenditure  generated  by it went 
for food, a larger  apartment,  or other  nondurables.  At the same  time,  one 
must  remember  that  the estimated  rebate  effects  are  point  estimates,  which 
are  subject  to sizable  error. 
THE  MICHIGAN  MODEL 
The Michigan  model is similar  to the DRI in that it splits consumer 
spending  into several  categories-automobiles,  furniture,  other durables, 
nondurables,  and  services-and it is similar  to the  MPS  im  that  it uses long 
distributed  lags on disposable  personal  income,  and thus predicts  effects 
from  the  rebate  lasting  for several  quarters.  Table  3 gives  the rebate  effects 
on total  consumption  and  several  subcategories  estimated  by the Michigan 
9.  The MPS model, in which the effect of the rebate is much more spread out in 
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Table 3.  Effect on Consumption  Expenditures  of the 1975 Tax Rebate, 
by Selected Categories, Michigan Model, Quarterly, 1975:2-1976:3 
Billions of 1972 dollars  except  as indicated 
Forecast 
Estimated actual effect 
Year and  error  Predicted  Cumulated 
quarter, anid  (actual -  effect of  Error assuming  as percent 
consumption  predicted)  rebate  no rebatea  of rebate 
category  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1975:2 
Durables  other 
than furniture  1.1  0.4  1.5  5.9 
Nondurables  and 
services  -6.4  5.1  -1.3  -5.1 
Subtotal  -5.3  5.5  0.2  0.8 
Furniture  2.1  2.6  4.7  18.4 
Total consumer 
spending  -3.2  8.1  4.9  19.2 
1975:3 
Durables  other 
than furniture  -1.1  4.0  2.9  17.2 
Nondurables 
and services  -1.0  2.5  1.5  0.8 
Subtotal  -2.1  6.5  4.4  18.0 
Furniture  4.7  -1.3  3.4  31.6 
Total consumer 
spending  2.6  5.2  7.8  49.6 
1975:4 
Durables  other 
than furniture  -1.4  0.6  -0.8  14.1 
Nondurables 
and services  -1.3  1.5  0.2  1.6 
Subtotal  -2.7  2.1  -0.6  15.7 
Furniture  7.3  0.6  7.9  62.5 
Total consumer 
spending  4.6  2.7  7.3  78.2 
model. Since every  equation  in the model contains  the lagged  dependent 
variable,  the  predicted  values  come  from  dynamic  simulations  that  use the 
computed  lagged dependent  variable  rather  than the actual value. The 
model underestimated  consumption  by a large $9.4 billion in 1975:1. It 
then overestimated  by some $3 billion  in the rebate  quarter,  1975:2, and 
underestimated  by growing  amounts  in subsequent  quarters,  with  the error 
peaking  at a remarkable  $12 billion  in 1976:1. As noted in discussing  the Franco Modigliani  and Charles  Steindel  187 
Table  3. (Continued) 
Estimated  actual effect 
Forecast 
Year and  error  Predicted  Cumulated 
quarter, and  (actual  -  effect of  Error assuming  as percenzt 
consumption  predicted)  rebate  no rebatea  of rebate 
category  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1976:1 
Durables  other 
than furniture  2.2  0.7  2.9  25.4 
Nondurables  and 
services  1.7  0.9  2.6  11.7 
Subtotal  3.9  1.6  5.5  37.1 
Furniture  8.0  -0.3  7.7  92.6 
Total consumer 
spending  11.9  1.3  13.2  129.7 
1976:2 
Durables  other 
than furniture  -1.3  -0.  1  -1.4  19.9 
Nondurables  and 
services  1.1  0.6  1.7  18.4 
Subtotal  -0.2  0.5  0.3  38.3 
Furniture  8.4  0.2  8.6  126.2 
Total consumer 
spending  8.2  0.7  8.9  164.5 
1976:3 
Durables  other 
than furniture  -2.5  -0.2  -2.7  9.4 
Nondurables  and 
services  3.0  0.5  3.5  32.0 
Subtotal  0.5  0.3  0.8  41.4 
Furniture  8.9  0.1  9.0  161.3 
Total consumer 
spending  9.4  0.4  9.8  202.7 
Source: Derived from the consuLmption  sector of  the Michigan econometric model,  described in  the 
text. 
a.  Column 1 plus column 2. 
DRI model, any model that underestimated  consumption  greatly  before 
and  after  the  rebate  will assert  that  a large  fraction  of the rebate  was spent. 
As column  4 shows,  the Michigan  model implies  that half the rebate  was 
spent  in two  quarters,  and  more  than  100 percent  in one year. 
The model's  specifications  imply  that  between  a fifth and a quarter  of 
the rebate  would  be spent  on durables  other  than  furniture  in the first  four 
quarters  after  the rebate  (column  2), and  this appears  to be what  actually 188  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
was  spent  on these  goods,  according  to the model's  projections  (column  4). 
(The reader  is again  reminded  that relatively  large standard  errors  un- 
doubtedly  go with  the estimated  rebate  effects  that  we can calculate.)  The 
model further  asserts  that a large fraction  of the rebate  should  be spent 
on nondurable  goods and services,  but only 12 percent  of the rebate  was 
actually  spent  in these  categories  by the end of the first  year (column  4). 
In these categories,  the estimated  actual effects of the rebate from the 
Michigan  model  are  not out of line with  what  the permanent-income  life- 
cycle hypothesis  would  predict.  However,  the aggregate  consumption  pre- 
diction  of the Michigan  model  also rests  on an implausibly  large  estimate 
of the amount  of the rebate  spent  on furniture-almost two-thirds  in three 
quarters,  and over 150 percent  in six quarters!  This estimate  comes, of 
course,  from the large  underestimation  of furniture  expenditure  in 1975 
and 1976, and suggests  that the furniture  equation  is quite unstable.  If 
the true  effect  of the  rebate  on furniture  was  no more  than  the  model  would 
predict  (column  2), then  less than a quarter  of the rebate  went into total 
consumption  spending  in the first  two quarters,  and about  40 percent  in 
a year, which is even lower than the estimates  from the MPS and from 
our own model (see below) .10 
An Alternative  Approach  to the  Treatment  of Tax Changes 
We have constructed  a model of consumer  expenditures  designed  to 
test explicitly  for differences  in the effects of permanent  and transitory 
changes  in tax liabilities.  Our framework  is the life-cycle hypothesis  of 
saving in its more general  form.11  This framework  supposes that con- 
sumers  respond  to changes  in labor income and wealth in a somewhat 
more complicated  fashion  than  equation  1 above suggests.  The basic hy- 
pothesis  behind  the extension  is that changes  in the rate of return  play 
a role in determining  the rate at which consumers  spend out of current 
human  and nonhuman  resources.  Simply  put, the coefficients  of both in- 
10. Measuring  the rebate  effect by a nondynamic  simulation  does not qualitatively 
change the results. A very large fraction (about one-third) of the rebate is estimated 
to have been spent on furniture  by the end of 1975, while only a relatively moderate 
amount (about another  third) is spent  on all other components  of consumer  spending. 
11. Franco Modigliani, "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of  Saving Twenty Years 
Later,"  in Michael Parkin  and A. R. Nobay, eds., Contemporary  Issues in Economics 
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come and  wealth  of the standard  life-cycle  model are  functions  of the rate 
of return,  which  leads  to 
(2)  Ct = (ao  +  airt)YL'  +  (bo  +  b,rt)Wtt_, 
where  rt is the long-run  rate  of return  net of taxes.  The term  rtWt-1  can be 
interpreted  as permanent  property  income (YPP); and the term  in rtYLP 
can be dropped  on the grounds  that  it is supposed  to be small,  which  helps 
to reduce  multicollinearity  problems.  Thus  equation  2 reduces  to 
(3)  Ct = aoYLt  +  biYPI  +  boWt-1. 
The sign  of b, depends  on the relative  strength  of the substitution  and in- 
come  effects;  it is positive  if, as we think  more  likely,  the income  effect  of a 
higher  rate  of return,  which  reduces  saving  by making  it easier  for a con- 
sumer  to attain a given saving goal, outweighs  the substitution  effect, 
which  makes  a larger  savings  goal easier  to reach  and  thus  more  tempting. 
We therefore  hypothesize  that b_ should be positive but less than one 
(which  may  be taken  as an upper  bound  as substitution  approaches  zero). 
In order  to measure  permanent  labor  and property  income,  we needed 
to estimate  the taxes on each. In line with the life-cycle hypothesis  and 
the  procedure  in the  MPS  model  we treated  taxes  on a liability  rather  than 
on a cash basis and allocated  total tax liability between the two com- 
ponents  following  the procedure  of Ando and Brown.12  The effective  tax 
rates  were calculated  as taxes on labor and property  income divided  by 
gross  labor  and property  income.'3  Finally,  since our tax rates are based 
on annual  data,  to avoid overly  abrupt  changes  at the end of the year we 
smoothed  the quarterly  series  by calculating  the applicable  tax rate in a 
quarter  as the mean of the effective tax rate for the current  and past 
quarters. 
We tested two ways of estimating permanent after-tax labor and prop- 
erty  income.  The first  is the traditional  one of using  current  income after 
tax and a polynomial distributed lag on past income after tax. The lag 
12. Albert Ando and E. Cary Brown, "Lags in Fiscal Policy," in Stabilization 
Policies, Prepared  for the Commission on Money and Credit (Prentice-Hall, 1963), 
pp. 97-163.  Details on the allocation of taxes, both the division and the quarterly 
allocation, can be obtained from the authors. Other taxes and nontaxes were added 
to consumption. 
13. Personal contributions for social insurance were considered a tax on labor 
income. We see no merit in the hypothesis that these contributions  are perceived  by 
households  as a form of saving, and some tests confirmed  that they could be properly 
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extends  over  six quarters  for labor  income  and  eight  quarters  for the more 
noisy property  income.  This traditional  approach  implicitly  assumes  that 
consumers  form  expectations  about  future  tax liabilities  by using  the same 
distributed  lag of past tax liabilities  that they use to estimate  permanent 
gross income from past gross income. It implies that they respond  to a 
change in income resulting from a permanent tax change in the same way 
that they respond  to variations  in before-tax  income, which presumably 
are  partly  transient.  It is clearly  a very  questionable  assumption. 
The alternative  approach  estimates  permanent  gross income using a 
distributed  lag on past gross  income and subtracting  from it an estimate 
of permanent  taxes  obtained  by applying  the latest  effective  tax rate.  This 
procedure  implies  that permanent  tax changes,  unlike changes  in gross 
income,  produce  their  full effects  immediately  (except  for the two-quarter 
smoothing  mentioned  above). 
This alternative  approach  would clearly  be inappropriate  whenever  a 
tax change  is regarded  as transitory  by a significant  portion  of consumers. 
For the 1968 temporary  surcharge  we deal with this problem  by estimat- 
ing the equation  as though  the tax increase  had been an ordinary  per- 
manent  one, but adding  a dummy  variable  for the eight quarters  of its 
duration.  The size and significance  of this dummy  should  provide  some 
evidence on the extent to which consumers  regarded  the surcharge  as 
transitory.  We estimate  our  equation  only through  1975:1 in order  to pre- 
vent  the  rebate  of 1975 from  contaminating  the coefficients. 
Labor  income  is defined  as salaries  and  wages  plus other  labor  income 
plus an estimate  of the imputed  labor income accruing  to proprietors. 
Property  income  is defined  as dividends,  rents,  and interest,  plus the non- 
labor  residual  of proprietors'  income. 
The two remaining  components  of personal  income,  social  security  and 
other  transfer  payments,  are entered  separately  on the grounds  that they 
tend to be concentrated  among  groups  whose income  is lower than their 
lifetime  norm.  Hence, in the spirit  of the life-cycle  hypothesis,  we expect 
that the propensities  to consume out of these payments-certainly the 
early  impact-would be appreciably  higher  than  that  out of labor  income. 
For social security  benefits  we expect  a very  high propensity  to consume, 
possibly  in excess  of unity.  The people  receiving  these  benefits  are  already 
retired  and should  have propensities  to consume  close to one; moreover, 
an increase  in these  benefits  should  tend  to reduce  saving  or increase  con- Franco Modigliani and Charles Steindel  191 
sumption  of those still working  by increasing  the expected  size of retire- 
ment  income. 
Other  investigators,  such as Lester Taylor and Thomas Juster,  have 
found  very  high  coefficients  for the sum  of these  two components  of trans- 
fer  payments  in equations  explaining  changes  in saving.'4  In contrast  to the 
life-cycle  implications  just described,  these results  imply an improbably 
low marginal  propensity  to consume rather  than an exceptionally  high 
one. We suggest  that these results  are largely  artifacts  of data definition 
and  measurement.  Before  the social security  system  was indexed  in 1972, 
the  federal  government  on at  least  three  occasions-during the third  quar- 
ter  of 1965 and  the second  quarters  of 1970 and 197  1-increased benefit 
levels and made the increases  retroactive  to the first of the year. Thus, 
in these quarters  massive  increases  in old-age, survivors,  disability,  and 
health insurance  benefits are recorded  in the national accounts.'5  It is 
reasonable  to suppose  that the bulk of these windfall  benefits  were saved 
in the  quarter  they  were  paid,  and  these  quarters  also show  sharp  increases 
in the saving  rate.  (This  seems  to explain,  for instance,  the increase  in the 
saving  rate in 1970:2, the quarter  before the end of the surcharge.)  Be- 
cause  the first  difference  in social security  payments  is reasonably  smooth 
except  for these "bumps,"  it is understandable  how one might obtain a 
low coefficient  for this variable  in an equation  explaining  the first  differ- 
ence  of saving. 
To deal with this problem,  we have constructed  a variable  approxi- 
mating  the windfall  social security  benefits.  We define  the windfall  as the 
increase  in OASDHI benefits  in the windfall  quarter,  and remove this 
variable  from  the OASDHI  benefit  variable,  adding  it as a separate  "semi- 
dummy"  variable. 
The rest of the transfer  payments  were treated  as a separate  variable. 
No distributed  lags were used on either transfers  or OASDHI benefits 
since they did not seem to be called for by the model, and in fact when 
tested  were  found  to be insignificant  and  small. 
Our  estimated  equations  also contain  a variable  to capture  the income 
expectations  of the unemployed,  which may be important  in periods  of 
14. Lester D. Taylor, "Saving  out of Different  Types of Income,"  BPEA, 2:1971, 
pp. 383-407,  and Juster, "A Note  on Prospective 1977 Tax Cuts and Consumer 
Spending." 
15. See relevant  issues of Survey of Current  Business for the details. 192  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1977 
severe  unemployment  like  that  beginning  in 1974. The variable,  employed 
earlier  by Modigliani  and Ando, is based on the conjecture  that the in- 
come expectation  of the average  unemployed  worker  is proportional  to 
the average  income of the employed.'6  It is formed as the current  and 
lagged values of the product  of the number  of unemployed  times labor 
income  divided  by the number  of employed.  The same  treatment  of taxes 
that  was  used  for the expected  labor  income  of the employed  was repeated 
for  that  of the  unemployed. 
In order  to achieve  more efficient  estimates,  the (iterated) Cochrane- 
Orcutt  technique  was used to estimate  the coefficient  of serial  correlation 
and the equations  were then transformed  by the estimates.  Finally, in 
order  to reduce  heteroskedasticity,  for purposes  of estimation  all variables 
were  scaled  by current  labor  income  after  taxes. 
Table 4 reports  the estimated  equations  for CON and for consumer 
expenditure,  which is our main concern  here.'7  All variables  are in per 
capita  1972 dollars.  The estimation  period  for all equations  is from 1955:4 
to 1975:1. 
Equation  4.1 uses the conventional  treatment  of taxes, while 4.2 uses 
our "permanent  tax" approach,  both with consumption  as the dependent 
variable.  Our  alternate  approach,  4.2, produces  a somewhat  better  fit-a 
modestly  smaller  standard  error  as well as a somewhat  smaller  autoregres- 
sion coefficient  for the error,  implying  a smaller  variance  for the raw  error 
u. In addition,  it yields  generally  more sensible  coefficient  estimates.  The 
coefficient  of wealth  (W), which  is distinctly  low in 4.1 as compared  with 
the results  of many  other  studies,  is nearly  50 percent  higher  in 4.2. Simi- 
larly,  the estimates  of the coefficients  of transfer  (TR) and  of social  secu- 
rity benefits  (SS), which  we expected  to be close to unity, are higher  in 
4.2, and  much  higher  than  some of the estimates  of others  mentioned  ear- 
lier,  though  they  still  remain  lower  than  our prior  expectations.  The long- 
run  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of labor  income-LY  and LYG 
( 1-  TL)-is  about 0.75  in each equation, with the short-run (impact) 
propensity  about  half of the long-run  one. The sum of the coefficients  on 
property  income-PY  and  PYG (1 -  Tp)-is  positive,  which  is consistent 
16. Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani,  "The 'Life Cycle' Hypothesis of Saving: 
Aggregate Implications and Tests," American Economic Review, vol. 53  (March 
1963), pp. 55-84. 
17. In the CON equations, the imputed rental income of durables  was added to 
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with our expectation  that the income effect dominates  the substitution 
effect.  The shape  of the distributed  lag is again  more reasonable  in 4.2, 
with  a smaller  proportion  of the total  weight  attached  to the current  value. 
However,  the sum  of the coefficients  in both equations  is somewhat  larger 
than  one, which  is not consistent  with our expectations,  and which  one of 
the authors  is investigating  further.  We  note,  however,  that  Modigliani  and 
Tarantelli  found  similar  results  for a consumption  function  estimated  for 
Italy.'8 
The social  security  dummy  is negative  in each equation  (though  insig- 
nificant). This unexpected  result is, however, consistent  with the hy- 
pothesis  that these windfall  increases  in OASDHI  benefits  had little im- 
mediate  positive  effect  on consumer  spending.  Finally,  the coefficient  for 
the current  value of the expected  income of the unemployed  (U  LY) is 
quite  low in each equation.  It appears  that wealth (which should  reflect 
cyclical  components)  and transfers  (which  include  unemployment  insur- 
ance benefits) pick up much of the effect of the current  value. In each 
equation,  the lagged  effect  is fairly  high and marginally  significant. 
The equations  for consumer  expenditure,  4.3 and  4.4, differ  from  those 
for  CON  primarily  in that  the distribution  of the coefficients  on the income 
variables,  both labor and property,  is shifted  heavily  toward  the present, 
with  the coefficient  of the current  variable  generally  accounting  for some 
two-thirds  of the total weight. Qualitatively,  this phenomenon  is to be 
expected  in view of the large evidence  that investment  in durable  goods 
is rather  responsive  to transitory  income  and saving.  However,  the extent 
of the shift  is somewhat  surprising  and  has the undesirable  consequence  of 
appreciably  reducing  the differential  effect  of the two alternative  ways of 
treating  taxes  because  the current  value  of after-tax  income  is identical  in 
the two alternatives.  As a result, the differences  in fit and in individual 
coefficients  between  4.3 and  4.4 are  much  smaller  than  the differences  be- 
tween  4.1 and 4.2, and frequently  they are quite minor.  The coefficients 
of wealth  are close to 0.04, which  is more nearly  consistent  with earlier 
studies (especially  since we include  property  income as a separate  vari- 
able). The  coefficients  of transfers  are  quite  close  to one and  those  of social 
security  are also slightly  higher  than in the CON equations.  Finally,  the 
18. F. Modigliani and E. Tarantelli, "The Consumption  Function in a Develop- 
ing Economy and the Italian Experience," American Economic Review, vol.  65 
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Table 4.  Estimated Consumption  Functions, Alternative Treatment 
of Taxes, 1955:4-1975 :la 
Consumption  as  Consumer  expenditures 
Variable  dependent variable  as dependent  variable 
and regression  Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation 
statistiCb  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4 
Variable 
LY  0.3958  0.3681  0.5341  0.5619 
(0.06143)  (0.06661)  (0.08093)  (0.08650) 
LY_o  0.3764  ...  0.2116 
(0.06834)  (0.07972) 
L YG_; (1-  TLPO  ...  0.3623  ...  0.1714 
(0.07184)  (0.08815) 
PY  0.2916  0.1415  0.4200  0.3784 
(0.1546)  (0.1708)  (0.2100)  (0.2303) 
py  ,d  0.8652  ...  0.1977  ... 
(0.3214)  (0.2276) 
PYG-  (1  Tp)d  ...  0.9024  ...  0.2834 
(0.2795)  (0.2456) 
SS  0.5762  0.6364  0.7001  0.6658 
(0.1839)  (0.1721)  (0.1842)  (0.1931) 
TR  0.7239  0.7516  0.8853  0.9390 
(0.2359)  (0.2414)  (0.3245)  (0.3384) 
W_1  0.02370  0.03300  0.03784  0.03809 
(0.006267)  (0.006237)  (0.007063)  (0.007207) 
D*LY  0.007292  0.008756  0.007772  0.008462 
(0.003461)  (0.003490)  (0.004398)  (0.004373) 
U.LY  0.04081  0.06088  0.01547  0.03448 
(0.08832)  (0.09652)  (0.1271)  (0.1361) 
U-i -L  Y-i  0.1824  ...  0.2182  ... 
(0.09132)  (0.1329) 
U1.L  YGl  (1-TL)  ...  0.2014  ...  0.2321 
(0.1012)  (0.1427) 
DSS  -0.1558  -0.1927  -0.1607  -0.1961 
(0.1956)  (0.2065)  (0.2973)  (0.3016) 
u_l  0.8719  0.7885  0.5193  0.5059 
(0.0550)  (0.0701)  (0.0974)  (0.09380) 
Regression  statistic 
Durbin-Watson  1.88  1.90  2.08  2.06 
Standard errore  0.004428  0.004224  0.005585  0.005665 
Standard error 
of unadjusted 
error termse  0.009037  0.006868  0.006540  0.006572 
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sum of the coefficients  of property  income is now around two-thirds, 
though  unfortunately  the estimates  are subject  to large  error,  presumably 
reflecting  a good  deal  of multicollinearity. 
TAX  CHANGES  OF  1964  AND  1968 
We next apply our equations  to consumer  expenditures  to study the 
major  tax-change  episodes  that  preceded  the 1975 rebate.  The tax cut of 
1964 was of indefinite  duration  and presumably  most people understood 
that it was. If our hypothesis  that permanent  tax cuts at once affect  per- 
manent  net income  and  hence  consumption  is a good approximation,  then 
our permanent  tax equation,  4.2, should  correctly  estimate  consumption 
in the early quarters  of 1964, while the conventional equation, 4. 1, should 
underestimate  it; if the conventional  view is valid, then 4.1 should  fore- 
cast  correctly,  and  4.2 should  overestimate  consumption.  The actual  errors 
of the two equations,  both with and without  autocorrelation  correction, 
are  reported  in table  5, rows  1 through  4. Using  the  permanent-tax  concept 
does not lead to an overestimate  of consumption.  On the contrary,  con- 
sumption  is somewhat  underestimated,  though once corrected  for the 
lagged  error  (row  2) the  forecast  appears  remarkably  close,  well below  one 
standard  error.  On the other  hand,  the equation  with  the conventional  tax 
treatment,  implying  a gradual  effect of the tax cut, underestimates  con- 
sumption  by greater  amounts  even  after  correction  for initial  error  (row  4), 
though  from  a statistical  point  of view  the errors-or their  difference  from 
those  of row  2-are  not very  significant.  This  limited  evidence  is consistent 
with the hypothesis  that permanent  tax changes  have a prompt  effect  on 
consumption. 
Notes to table 4. 
Sources: See discussion in text. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
b. The variables are defined as follows: 
L Y = labor income after taxes 
L YG = labor income before taxes 
P Y =  property  income after taxes 
P YG = property  income before taxes 
U =  number of unemployed/number of employed 
SS  = OASDHI payments adjusted for windfalls 
TR = transfer  payments other than OASDHI payments 
W-i = net worth of consumers at start of quarter 
D =  dummy variable for surcharge  period 
DSS  = windfall OASDHI payments 
TL = labor tax rate 
Tp = property tax rate 
uL1  = previous quarter's  error. 
c.  This is the sum of coefficients on the independent variable from period I -  1 to i -  6. 
d. This is the sum of coefficients on the independent variable from period i -  1 to i -  8. 
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The surcharge  in force  between  1968:3 and 1970:2 was announced  as 
temporary;  hence, our equation  4.4, which applies  directly  only to per- 
manent  tax changes,  should  underestimate  consumption  in this period.  In 
fact, the dummy  variable  (D)  for this period  in equation  4.4 is positive 
and  roughly  twice  its standard  error. 
Our equation  can provide  an estimate  of the extent to which the sur- 
charge  was less effective  in constraining  consumption  than a permanent 
tax of the same  magnitude.  This  is done  by comparing  actual  consumption 
first with the value predicted  by 4.4 for a permanent  tax increase,  and 
second  with the value  predicted  by 4.4 on the assumption  that there  had 
been no tax increase  at all-which  is equivalent  to saying  that the tax in- 
crease  had no effect.  The estimates  are presented  in rows 5 through  7 of 
table 5. Results based on equation  4.3 are similar  and are not shown. 
Row 5 shows  the error  of forecast  during  the surcharge  period:  it is com- 
puted  without  correction  for the initial  error,  which  was moderate  (some 
$2.4 billion) and could noticeably  affect  only the initial quarters.  Con- 
sumption  exceeds the computed  values in every quarter,  confirming  the 
conclusion  that treating  the surcharge  as a permanent  tax results  in an 
underestimate  of consumption.  Row 6 shows the effects on expenditure 
implied  by equation  4.4 for a permanent  tax increase  with the same  rates 
as the surcharge;  it is the difference  between  consumption  estimated  by 
4.4 with and without  the surcharge.  Finally, row 7, the sum of rows 5 
and 6, is our estimate  of the actual  effects  of the surcharge  on consump- 
tion.  This  estimate  is negative  everywhere  until  the final  quarter  and  plau- 
sible in shape.  It implies  that  from the second  half of 1968 to the end of 
1969, the reduction  in consumption  was roughly  half as large as it would 
have been had the tax been permanent,  which is broadly  consistent  with 
Okun's  results.'9  By 1970, however,  little  of the surcharge  apparently  was 
regarded  as a permanent  tax liability.  One might  facetiously  suggest  that 
by the first  half of 1970, after  the surcharge  was formally  given its burial 
date, consumers  knew  that it was a temporary  tax and treated  it as such, 
but  before  then  they  were  divided  between  their  hopes  and  their  fears. 
THE  1975  TAX  REBATE 
Since  equation  4.4 yields  a credible  picture  of the response  of consump- 
tion to the 1964 and 1968 tax changes, what light does it shed on the 1975 
19. Okun, "Personal  Tax Surcharge  and Consumer  Demand." 00 
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tax rebate?  We have extrapolated  our equation from 1975:2 through 
1976:3 on the assumption  that there  was no tax rebate  at all; any excess 
of actual  consumption  over  this projection  will provide  an estimate  of the 
response  of consumption  to the  rebate.20 
Our  results  are shown  in table 6. Row 1 gives the prediction  errors- 
that  is, the estimated  actual  effect-when the extrapolation  is carried  out 
without  taking  into account  the initial  error  (amounting  to some $3 billion 
in 1975:1), while  row 2 gives the errors  with the autocorrelation  correc- 
tion. All of the entries  are positive, implying  that the rebate had some 
effect on consumption,  but they are modest, especially for the error- 
corrected  projections,  considering  that  the  rebate  was  nearly  $26 billion. 
The modest  impact  of the rebate  is illustrated  in rows 3 and 4, which 
cumulate  the estimated  effects  over successive  quarters  and express  them 
as a percentage  of the rebate.  The error-corrected  projection  (row  4) im- 
plies that less than one-fourth  of the rebate  was spent in the first three 
quarters,  while the raw projections  raise that estimate  but only to one- 
third.  As in the case of the MPS,  the estimated  effect  of the rebate  is much 
stronger  beginning  with the fourth  quarter  after  the rebate, 1976:1, and 
both projections  imply  that nearly  all the rebate  was spent  by the end of 
the sixth  quarter.  However,  it is hard  to take this result  seriously  because 
it implies  a most  improbable  pattern  of consumers'  responses.  Our  model, 
like the MPS,  may be tending  to underestimate  consumption  in 1976 for 
reasons  such  as errors  in the independent  variables  used in the projections 
that  are  unrelated  to our  treatment  of the  rebate. 
The conclusion  that  no prompt  surge  of expenditure  was caused  by the 
rebate  is also supported  by the last two rows of the table, analyzing  ex- 
pected and actual  changes  in saving.21  Row 5 gives the actual  change  in 
saving,  and row 6 the change  in saving  computed  from equation  4.4 on 
the assumption  that consumers  totally ignored  the rebate.  Row 6 only 
modestly  overstates  the huge rise in saving in the second quarter,  and 
20. The information needed to split income, and especially tax liability, between 
labor and capital after 1974 is not yet fully available and hence we have had to esti- 
mate the split relying on extrapolation  from earlier data; it seems unlikely to us that 
errors  arising  from this allocation would seriously  affect  the results. 
21.  For this purpose, "saving"  is defined as disposable personal income less con- 
sumption, so it includes interest paid by consumers and personal transfer payments 
to foreigners. These are fairly static series, and thus do not contribute  much to the 
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Table 6.  Effect on Consumption  Expenditures  of the 1975 Tax Rebate, 
Permanent  Tax Model, Quarterly, 1975:1-1976:3 
Billions  of dollars  except  as indicated 
Year  and  quarter 
1975  1976 
Item  2  3  4  1  2  3 
Estimated  actual  effect  of rebate 
(error  assuiming  no rebate) 
1. Without  autocorrelation 
correction  3.0  2.7  3.1  5.9  5.0  5.6 
2. With  autocorrelation 
correction  1.4  1.8  2.7  5.7  4.8  5.5 
Estimated  actual  effect  cumulated, 
as percent  of rebate 
3. Without  autocorrelation 
correction  11.7  22.2  34.3  57. 3  76.8  98.7 
4. With autocorrelation 
correction  5.5  12.5  23.0  45.3  64.1  85.6 
Change  in saving 
5. Actual  28.9  -20.4  1.8  -3.9  3.2  -5.6 
6. Predicted  30.3  -20.0  2.7  -0.9  2.3  -4.9 
Source: Derived from table 4, equation 4.4. 
generally  tracks  remarkably  well the wide swings in saving during  this 
period. 
Again, the modest estimate  of the impact  suggested  by table 6 repre- 
sents  only a point estimate  whose reliability  must  be assessed  against  the 
standard  error  of the equation.  This error  (roughly  one-half  of 1 percent 
of consumption)  amounts  by 1975 to some $3.5 billion to $4 billion. 
Although  it is a modest  standard  error  as consumption  functions  go, it is 
unfortunately  large in comparison  with the size of the rebate (approxi- 
mately 15 percent of the $26 billion). Therefore,  on the basis of our 
results,  one cannot  reasonably  reject  the hypothesis  either  that  by the end 
of the first  year  the proportion  spent  was negligible,  or that it was nearly 
as large  as the rebate.  The one hypothesis  that we can reasonably  reject 
is that  the rebate  was treated  as two consecutive  permanent  tax changes; 
in this case the error  would have been $10 billion in both 1975:2 and 
1975:3. 200  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1977 
Conclusion 
We have tried  to provide  evidence  that consumers  respond  differently 
to different  types  of tax changes,  even  though  these  may take  away  or give 
them the same amount  of cash in the short  run, and that the differential 
response  is, at least qualitatively,  in line with the predictions  of the per- 
manent-income  and  life-cycle  hypotheses.  We have  been  particularly  con- 
cerned  with  the effect  of a one-time  rebate  or levy such  as the one enacted 
in 1975 because  a similar  rebate  was proposed  in 1977 and may be pro- 
posed again  despite  wide disagreement  as to the effectiveness  of the 1975 
rebate. 
In studying  the 1975 episode  we have relied on three  existing  models 
of consumer  demand  and  one especially  constructed  to study  the effect  of 
tax changes.  We find  an apparent  dichotomy  between  the models of con- 
sumption  that are  fundamentally  based  upon a single  equation  (our  "per- 
manent  tax"  equation  and the MPS model), and the models that rely on 
estimating  consumption  as the sum  of many  components  (DRI and  Michi- 
gan). The first two models estimate  that only a modest fraction  of the 
rebate  entered  the spending  stream  in 1975 while  the second  two estimate 
that  a great  deal  of the rebate  was spent  by the end of 1975. Closer  exam- 
ination  blurs  this dichotomy.  The high estimate  of spending  in the Michi- 
gan model comes largely  from the furniture  equation,  which greatly  un- 
derestimated  consumer  spending  in this  area  even  with  the rebate  included 
in disposable  income.  If we merely  cut down the estimated  furniture  re- 
sponse  to that  which  should  have been generated  by the rebate  according 
to the model, we get an estimated  total effect  by the end of 1975 that is 
close to the one estimated  from the single-equation  models.  No compar- 
able aberrant  component  stands  out sharply  in the DRI model, though 
some of its disaggregated  projections  raise doubts  about its estimates  of 
total consumption.  In particular,  the estimate  of rebate-induced  food ex- 
penditure  is approximately  twice  that  suggested  by the  model  and  accounts 
for a large fraction  of the total estimate  of rebate-induced  expenditure. 
We conclude,  therefore,  that there  is strong,  though  not uniform,  evi- 
dence that a rebate is not a particularly  effective way of producing  a 
prompt  and  temporary  stimulus  to consumption. 
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alternative  to a rebate  as a tool of policy is a permanent income tax cut. 
In the first  place, a rebate  could be structured  so as to be more effective 
than  that  of 1975. For example,  the now defunct  1977 rebate  could have 
proven  somewhat  more  effective  than  the 1975 one, since  payments  were 
to be concentrated  in lower-income  groups, including  beneficiaries  of 
transfer  payments.  But, more important,  the alternative  to a transitory 
cut in income  taxes is not a permanent one, which  is simply  not compar- 
able since it implies a loss of revenue many times higher. Rather, the 
alternative  is a change  in some other  tax, and preferably  one that is made 
more, rather  than less, effective  by its temporary  nature.  One candidate 
would  be a temporary  reduction  in sales and excise taxes, which should 
stimulate  consumer  spending  fairly strongly  while it lasted. The bulk of 
these taxes are paid at the state and local level, but reductions  in them 
could  be financed  by increases  in federal  revenue  sharing.  We do feel that 
countercyclical  tax policy is both possible and desirable,  but as the life- 
cycle and permanent-income  theories  would  predict,  we find that the ex- 
periences  of the last decade  do not lend much  support  to the proposition 
that temporary  changes in income tax liabilities or tax rebates are an 
efficacious  method  of rapidly  changing  consumer  spending. 
APPENDIX 
Alternative  Treatment  of Other  1975 
Tax and Transfer  Changes 
As NOTED in the text, the rebate  was not the only tax cut in 1975:2. The 
largest  one was the rebate,  but there  was also an increase  in the standard 
deduction  and a $30 credit  for each dependent.  The last two measures, 
which  went into effect  on April 30, 1975, were initially  labeled as "tem- 
porary,"  but, after many vicissitudes,  were reenacted  by the end of the 
year. Our projection incorporates  these tax reductions,  which means 
that we implicitly  treat them as though they were perceived  as perma- 
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move this assumption  from our estimate  of consumer  expenditures.  Our 
estimate  of the marginal  propensity  to consume  out of "permanent"  taxes 
in 1975 is roughly  0.75. The value  of the nonrebate  part  of the tax pack- 
age was approximately  $8 billion (annual  rate) in the second quarter  of 
1975  and $12  billion thereafter (Survey of  Current Business,  vol.  55, 
April 1975), or $6.4 billion and $9.6 billion in 1972 dollars.  Since we 
assume  that tax liabilities  are averaged  over quarters  by consumers,  this 
implies a perceived  decline  in "permanent"  tax liabilities  of $3.2 billion 
in 1975:2, $8.0 billion in 1975:3, and $9.6 billion thereafter.  The esti- 
mates of consumption  can then be reduced  by 0.75x (the perceived  de- 
cline in permanent  tax liabilities). A sensible measure  of the stimulus 
afforded  by the 1975 package  can be given by the estimated  increase  in 
consumption  afforded  by the  package  (the sum  of the residuals  in the con- 
sumption  forecast  divided  by 4, to convert  annual  rates  to amount  spent) 
divided  by the cumulated  loss in revenue  by the government;  the latter  is 
given by the $6.4 billion that the rebate cost the government  plus the 
cumulated  loss from  the other  provisions-which in the first  quarter  cost 
the government  $1.6 billion (6.4 divided  by 4)  and in each additional 
quarter  $2.4 billion more. If these adjustments  are made, we estimate 
that only about 12 percent  of the lost revenue  was consumed  in the first 
quarter,  and  42 percent  by the end  of 1975. 
A similar  problem  results  from the $50 bonuses  paid to recipients  of 
OASDHI  and  supplemental  security  income  pensions.  The bonus  cost the 
government  $6.8 billion (current  dollars  at annual  rates) in 1975:2. It is 
listed  in the national  income  accounts  and  treated  by us as a transfer  pay- 
ment  other  than  social security,  which  has an MPC  of 0.94. If it is treated 
as a social  security  payment  (MPC, 0.67) the estimate  of consumption  in 
1975:2 will be reduced  by $1.5 billion (1972 prices), which  will increase 
the estimated  percentage  of the rebate  consumed  by about  5 percent.  One 
may prefer  to treat  this payment  as a windfall.  Our estimate  of the MPC 
out of historic  social security  windfalls  is a dubious -0.19.  We hesitate 
to use this coefficient  or, indeed,  to treat  this payment  as a windfall,  since 
social security  recipients  received  a cost-of-living  increase  in 1975:3, and 
we feel it is reasonable  to assume  that  this increase  was, to a large  extent, 
foreseen  by recipients;  so the $50 bonus (which  was roughly  equal  to the 
increase  that did occur  in 1975:3) could be read as an early advance  on 
the raise, not as a windfall.  Anyone who feels that this payment  was a Franco Modigliani and Charles Steindel  203 
windfall  and  has  an  idea  of the  MPC  out of this  kind  of payment  can adjust 
our  estimates.  However,  we would  then  suggest  that  the estimated  propor- 
tion of the rebate  spent-lines  3 and  4 in table 6-be  modified  to include 
the  social  security  payments  in the  denominator. 
Discussion 
Saul  H. Hymans:  Modigliani  and Steindel  have carried  out an interesting 
double-barreled  attack  on the question  of whether  the temporary  tax re- 
bate of 1975 stimulated  consumer  spending.  They investigated  the evi- 
dence provided  by a number  of the operating  macroeconometric  models 
(DRI, Michigan,  and  MPS), as well as that  provided  by their  own  special- 
purpose  model (MS) from equations  constructed  especially  to focus on 
the  rebate  issue. 
The methodology  is reasonably  straightforward.  A given equation  is 
used first  to calculate  what effect the rebate  "should  have had"  for each 
quarter  in the period 1975:2-1976:3. That same equation  is then run 
over the same period using actual predictor  variables (but generating 
its own lagged  consumption  data or lagged  residuals  when appropriate) 
and its residuals  are calculated.  If an equation  implies that the rebate 
should  have increased  consumption  by $5 billion in 1975:2 and then the 
equation  overpredicts  actual consumption  by $4 billion in 1975:2, it is 
estimated  that the rebate resulted  in only $1 billion of additional  con- 
sumption. 
When  the authors  apply  their  methodology,  they obtain  rather  varied 
results  from the different  models and equations.  Thus the MPS model 
indicates  that 30 percent  of the 1975 rebate  was spent in the first two 
quarters  (1975:2 and 1975:3); DRI comes out with 58 percent  spent  in 
two quarters;  Michigan  50 percent;  and  the special-purpose  MS equation 
yields an effect of only 121/2  percent  in two quarters.  If Michigan  and 
DRI are close to the mark,  then the tax rebate  of 1975 would  have to be 
judged  as having  been an effective  "quick  fix" for consumer  demand;  if 
MPS and  MS are the more reliable,  then the tax rebate  cost the federal 
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quarters  (1975:2-1976: 1), the authors  find  the  following  estimates  of the 
amount  of rebate  spent:  MPS,  61 percent;  MS, 45 percent;  Michigan,  130 
percent-again  a substantial  difference,  with MPS and MS indicating  a 
rather  disappointing  impact  after  one year and Michigan  a huge impact. 
Modigliani  and  Steindel  then  proceed  to reject  results  such  as those  shown 
by DRI and  Michigan  and accept  the more  modest  impacts  inferred  from 
MPS and MS. DRI's estimated  effects  put more of the additional  con- 
sumer  expenditure  in food and  housing  services  than  the authors  can  find 
believable.  Michigan's  estimates  of 50 percent  and 130 percent  after  two 
and four quarters,  respectively,  would have been reduced  to 18 percent 
and 37 percent  if the effects  estimated  to be due to furniture  (and house- 
hold equipment) were eliminated.  Since the furniture  (and household 
equipment)  effects  are  so "implausible,"  Modigliani  and  Steindel  conclude 
that the corresponding  equation  in the Michigan  model must be "quite 
unstable."  This conclusion brings Michigan into line with the results 
shown  by MPS and  MS, adding  further  support  to a negative  conclusion 
regarding  a quick  and  sizable  impact  from  a tax rebate. 
The extent  to which  the results  of MPS,  MS, and "Michigan  excluding 
furniture"  may  be considered  comparably  reliable  is shown  in the follow- 
ing comparison  of residuals  (in billions  of 1972 dollars) for the 1975:2- 
1976:3 period: 
Michigan 
MPS  MS  excluding  furniture 
1975:2  -5.0  1.4  -5.3 
3  -0.3  1.8  -2.1 
4  -1.7  2.7  -2.7 
1976:1  4.6  5.7  3.9 
2  2.1  4.8  -0.2 
3  1.7  5.5  0.5 
Root mean-square 
error  3.07  4.05  3.07 
Bias  0.23  3.65  -1.02 
On the whole, MPS and Michigan  excluding  furniture-with no special 
treatment  distinguishing  between temporary  and permanent  taxes-do 
somewhat  better on RMSE grounds  than MS, which assumes  that tem- 
porary  tax changes  have no effect  on consumer  spending;  but the differ- 
ences are relatively  small. In a rough  way, it appears  that MS exhibits  a 
progressively  worsening  underprediction  by ignoring  the 1975 tax rebate 
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sumption  in the quarters  immediately  after  the rebate  and then begin to 
underpredict  after  three  quarters.  From  the bias, however,  it appears  that 
MS would have to be interpreted  as providing  a lower-limit  estimate  of 
the rebate effect over a six-quarter  span, whereas  MPS and Michigan 
excluding  furniture  "work  out their errors"  and come out about right 
after  six quarters. 
Now what of the furniture  (and household  equipment) error  in the 
Michigan  model?  The Modigliani-Steindel  suggestion  that the equation 
must be out of control or "unstable"  hardly  seems warranted.  As esti- 
mated (through  1974:4) the equation  has a standard  error  of $0.43 bil- 
lion (1972 dollars) and its single-equation  residuals  around  the time of 
the 1975  rebate  are  as follows: 
1975:1  0.18 
2  2.05 
3  2.28 
4  2.30 
1976:1  0.75 
2  0.96 
3  1.17 
4  0.30 
Thus  the  equation  was  on track  in 1975:  1, way  off  during  1975:2-1975:4, 
and  back  to track  by the end of 1976. Should  the huge  and  very  systematic 
underpredictions  of $2 billion to $2.3 billion in 1975:2-1975:4 be re- 
garded  as evidence  of an incredibly  unstable  equation,  or did furniture 
and  household  equipment  really  benefit  from  the tax rebate?  In truth,  it's 
difficult  to believe  that  furniture  and  household  equipment  benefited  to the 
extent estimated  by the Michigan  model, but something  certainly  hap- 
pened  to an equation  that  has not generally  been very  troublesome  within 
the model, and that now appears  to be on track again. The rebates  of 
1975 were of the order of $100 per household-an  amount  that buys 
outright  a small  item of furniture  or a minor  household  appliance,  or that 
makes a significant  downpayment  on a major  household  durable.  With 
the auto  market  still reeling  from  the oil embargo  at the time  of the rebate, 
is it so unreasonable  to believe that household  furniture  and appliances 
were a major  beneficiary  of the tax rebate?  The permanent-income  life- 
cycle analysis  certainly  would have to regard  the purchase  of such dura- 
bles as a logical  way to "save"  and  provide  a future  flow of consumption 
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The issue of the effectiveness  of the 1975 tax rebate  hardly  seems to 
have  been settled  by the  Modigliani-Steindel  study.  Further  analysis  seems 
to be in order,  and  I suggest  that  the pessimistic  conclusion  of Modigliani 
and  Steindel  should  be regarded  as highly  tentative. 
F. Thomas  Juster:  I have  two comments  on the Modigliani-Steindel  paper 
on the effect of tax cuts on consumption  and consumer  spending.  The 
first  relates  to their  reference  to some  results  contained  in a paper  of mine 
on the same subject  ("A Note on Prospective  1977 Tax Cuts and Con- 
sumer  Spending").  The second relates  to their  procedure  for estimating 
the effect  of rebates.  Finally,  I would  also like to comment  on the effect  on 
consumers  and consumer  spending  of the administration's  decision to 
drop  the  tax  rebate. 
Modigliani  and  Steindel  view  my results  as evidence  that  neither  transi- 
tory  nor permanent  tax cuts  would  have  much  impact  on consumer  spend- 
ing during 1977 because the adjustment  processes are relatively  slow. 
While  this assessment  is technically  correct  with respect  to the point esti- 
mates in my equation,  I would  not make the same inference  as they do, 
for two reasons. 
First, in the process  of examining  the impact  of tax changes  on con- 
sumption  in the model,  I experimented  with  the idea that  the effect  of tax 
changes  is different  for tax  increases  and  decreases.  Although  the evidence 
in favor of a differential  is not robust (t ratios are around  1), the point 
estimates  indicate  that a tax cut has more  impact  on consumption  than a 
tax increase;  that is, a tax reduction  affects  consumption  more than the 
overall  coefficient  suggests,  while a tax increase  affects  consumption  less. 
Given the stickiness  of consumption  in the face of income declines  ema- 
nating from any source and the presumption  that windfalls  of all sorts 
(including  rebates)  represent  opportunities  for consumers  to eat into  their 
list of unmet  consumption  needs, I find  those results  plausible.  They im- 
ply that the response  to a tax cut might  be substantially  faster  than indi- 
cated  by the Modigliani-Steindel  analysis. 
Second, the response  pattern  in my equation  is, of course, based on 
point estimates  of the tax and lagged-saving  coefficients.  In the paper,  I 
suggest  that the coefficient  of lagged  saving  is likely to be biased  upward 
because conventionally  measured  saving (which is the dependent  vari- 
able) has serially  correlated  errors.  To test the sensitivity  of the equation 
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coefficient.  The point  estimate  was 0.91, and  the constraints  ranged  down 
to 0.7. It turned  out that the constrained  equation  also makes the tax- 
change coefficient  smaller in absolute terms, implying that the entire 
process  of getting  tax rebates  or other tax cuts into the spending  stream 
might  be substantially  more rapid  than the point estimates  indicate.  The 
other  variables  in the equation  are hardly  affected  by the constraint,  and 
the standard  error  of estimate  rises by less than 10 percent  even with the 
0.7 constraint  (which is about  four standard  errors  away  from the point 
estimate).  I infer  that  there  is a band  of plausible  outcomes  described  by 
the constrained  regressions  and that the Modigliani-Steindel  estimate  of 
response  from  my equation  is at one end of the plausible  range. 
The next issue concerns  the specification  of the basic equations  in the 
Modigliani-Steindel  paper. The authors  estimate  consumption  patterns 
without  rebates (or, in the case of 1968, without  the temporary  surtax) 
by using  prediction  errors  from a simulation  that ignores  the existence  of 
temporary  tax changes.  But  that  procedure  holds  up only if the equation  is 
perfectly  specified;  otherwise  errors  arise  from a combination  of causes, 
only one of which is the omitted transitory  tax change. Interestingly 
enough,  their preferred  equation  has a time path for the rebate  part of 
the 1975 tax cut that is not credible, as they themselves  point out: it 
implies  that  the effect  of the rebate  accelerates  through  time,  being  larger 
in the fourth  through  the sixth quarters  after  the rebate  than in the first 
through  the third  quarters. 
One possibility  is that the Modigliani-Steindel  equation  systematically 
underestimates  the upward  trend  in consumer  demand  during  1975 and 
1976 because  it contains  no way to model  the reduced  uncertainties  faced 
by consumers  during  this period of recovery.  If that is so, their severe 
underprediction  for 1976 would be explained  (because  uncertainty  was 
low then), and it might  well be true that their  predicted  values for con- 
sumption  during  1975 would  be lower than shown (because  uncertainty 
was high then). Thus the overall  result  could easily be a rebate  pattern 
that is substantially  larger  in the early quarters,  substantially  smaller  or 
negligible  in the later  quarters.  That  kind  of time pattern  certainly  makes 
more  sense, and it could totally reverse  their conclusion  that only about 
one-fourth  to one-third of the rebate was spent during the first three 
quarters. 
In sum, if the Modigliani-Steindel  equation  is misspecified  because  it 
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the 1975-76 period,  I do not see  how one can  tell anything  from  that  equa- 
tion about  the effect  of the rebate,  since the observed  errors  are a com- 
bination of a missing uncertainty  effect and an omitted rebate effect. 
Modigliani  and Steindel  want  to use errors  in their equation  to measure 
the second,  but the errors  may be measuring  a combination  of the two as 
well as other  unspecified  influences  on consumer  spending. 
Finally, I have a brief comment  about the possible effects of the re- 
cently announced  decision  to drop the rebate  from the administration's 
plans  for 1977. In a Survey  Research  Center  study  conducted  in February 
1977, we inquired  about the effect of the rebate.  About 60 percent  of 
consumers  expected  the rebate  to become  law, about  70 percent  thought 
that  it would  be good  for the economy,  and  about  80 percent  were  in favor 
of it. Thus a considerable  majority  of consumers  expected  the rebate  to 
pass and  thought  it would  be good  for the economy. 
Analysis of the effect  of the rebate  on consumer  optimism  shows an 
interesting  result.  Dividing  the sample  into those expecting  the rebate  to 
pass and those expecting  something  else (not to pass, uncertain,  and so 
on), there  is little or no difference  between  the two groups  in perceptions 
of past income  change  or business  conditions,  but there  is a big difference 
in expectations  about the future. Respondents  expecting  the rebate to 
pass were  much  more  optimistic  about  business  conditions,  both over the 
next year and over the next five years, and about  whether  market  condi- 
tions for buying  houses and household  durables  would be favorable  or 
unfavorable.  Overall,  the index of consumer  sentiment  stood at 90 for 
those expecting  the rebate  to pass and at 80 for others. 
Thus  the relatively  high  level of optimism  shown  in the February  1977 
survey  of consumer  attitudes  must  be attributed  in part  to the widespread 
presumption  that  the rebate  would  pass and that it would  have favorable 
effects on the economy.  The decision  to forgo the rebate  will therefore 
produce disappointment  and some negative effect on the general  level 
of consumer  optimism,  in addition  to its direct  effect  on consumer  income 
and  expenditure. 
General  Discussion 
Arthur  Okun applauded  the way the authors  had separated  the re- 
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noting  that  this  practice  accorded  with  the spirit  of the life-cycle  formula- 
tion. He thought  that the procedure  could usefully  be pushed  further  to 
distinguish  between  overtime  and straight-time  pay, year-end  dividends, 
and so forth.  But, he emphasized,  the results  pointed  to a rapid  consump- 
tion response  for most types  of income.  He also found  it amusing  that  the 
authors  were willing  to attribute  full effectiveness  to the nonrebate  por- 
tion of the temporary  1975 tax cut, which  was, in his view, closely analo- 
gous  to the 1968 surcharge. 
Both Okun  and Lawrence  Klein questioned  the analysis  of the disag- 
gregated  components  of the models. Okun  said that disaggregated  equa- 
tions are used to take advantage  of the ability  to identify  factors  that in- 
fluence  demand  in particular  sectors,  and that, in summing  to totals, one 
expects  some canceling  out of errors  with opposite  signs.  He objected  to 
the concept of "estimated  actual  effect"  in tables 2 and 3. It was clear, 
for example,  that  DRI underestimated  food outlays  in 1975:2 and 1975:3 
on any view of the effectiveness  of the rebate;  but the error  was largest 
assuming  no effect of the rebate.  Klein felt that the amounts  attributed 
to the rebate  fell within the standard  tolerance  intervals  of predictions 
from  the sectoral  equations.  H-e  also pointed  out that most observers  ex- 
pected  the rebate  would  be spent  on nondurables  such as food and  cloth- 
ing and other "small  ticket"  items. Since the model equations  could not 
have been estimated  to take explicit  account  of an event such as the re- 
bate, one would  expect  spending  in these areas  to be exceptionally  strong 
when  the rebate  was treated  simply  as a normal  increment  to income. 